

New Frontiers of Electoral Influence: Russia's Involvement in Moldova's 2024 Referendum and Presidential Elections

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
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Introduction & Context

- 1. Historical Perspective
- 2. Geostrategic Importance
- 3. Social & Political Vulnerabilities
- 4. Russian Hybrid Warfare



Overview of the 2024 Elections Sapere Aude et Agere

- Referendum and presidential vote: key geopolitical stakes.
- Main issue: EU integration vs. pro-Russian orientation.
- ► Electoral fraudes:
 - documented by Information and Security Service (SIS)
 Journalist investigations





- Foreign influence in 2024 through the use of platforms, agents, and tools for hybrid interference.
- ► Russian interference was identified across multiple vectors:
 - a) Amplification of radical separatist-autonomist tendencies;
 - b) Propaganda and disinformation;
 - c) Exploitation of the ecclesiastical factor;
 - d) Interference by the Russian Federation in Moldova's electoral process;
 - e) Subversive operations conducted by Russian intelligence services;
 - f) Exploitation of organized crime elements;
 - g) Energy-related blackmail.



► FOREIGN INTERFERENCE COORDINATION STRUCTURE:

Moscow coordination staff

Chisinau - executive staff

119 Territorial Cells


1,900 Primary Cells

33,000 Activists

84,000 Supporters



"Victory" Block:



- > 3 Call Centers based in Moscow responsible for:
- o communication with primary organizations,
- managing relations with the formation's activists,
- o maintaining and strengthening relations with supporters.
- > Telegram chatbot @KYCMD_bot through which:
- activists were registered,
- o electoral and propaganda measures were coordinated,
- control, including registration in the app, granting the mobile phone access to location data, submission of identity document copies, and user identification via photo/video/biometric verification.



- A full spectrum of hybrid tools (financial, media, human, logistical, technical, counterintelligence, and combat capabilities) applied into these steps:
- 1. Creation of EVRAZIA in April 2024 in Moscow
- 2. SOFT: Financing, logistics, media support: Youth & religious leaders
- 3. **HARD:** preparing the driving force for the destabilization scenario
- 4. Creation of "Moldovan" organizations on the territory of the Russian Federation



► ILLICIT FINANCING:

EXTERNAL:

- •Organized transport of cash from the Russian Federation to Moldova by so-called couriers and associated persons (via air routes).
- •Money transfers from Russia conducted through bank accounts at PSB/PROMSVYAZBANK (subject to international sanctions) using the Russian payment system MIR, with sums transferred via payment platforms from Uzbekistan; P2P transfers through banks and payment platforms in Central Asia, and money transfer systems such as Zolotaya Korona.
- •Regions affiliated with ŞOR (Gagauzia, Taraclia, and Orhei) signed trilateral contracts with EVRAZIA and PSB for receiving financial resources camouflage illegal financing and electoral corruption.
- •"youth grants" and "employment contracts" were made for Moldovan citizens.
- •To utilize the funds received on Russian MIR cards, certain individuals acted as "intermediaries of transfers from Russia" (hereinafter "service providers"). Cases were documented where a service provider transferred funds to the Moldovan bank card of an activist or supporter, via P2P transactions, from the service provider's personal card or from cards issued to third parties (so-called "drops"), including using platforms such as BINANCE and BYBIT (the latter allowing transfers from Russian cards to Moldovan cards).
- •Following the <u>suspension</u> by commercial banks of P2P operations from bank cards issued in Central Asia, transfers to accounts opened with <u>electronic money</u> issuing companies have intensified.
- •Russian special services, through individuals close to the ŞOR group, use the TRUSTEE app (Trustee Plus UAB "Trustee Global", Lithuania) as a financing mechanism.

► INTERNAL:

"donors" for the election campaign



- Elections monitoring
- Cyber issues
- False bombing alerts



DEFENSE AND SECURITY The Role of Disinformation


- Narratives: 'EU = loss of sovereignty',
 'NATO = war', 'Russia = protector'.
- Channels: Telegram, TikTok, local portals.
- Impact: polarization, confusion, and voter manipulation.

Implications for 2025 Elections



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- massive Russian interference
- illicit funding: One party in Dodon's bloc was barred from running two days before the vote
- network promising to pay participants if they posted pro-Russian propaganda and fake news
- Digital Army of Kremlin (ZdG) investigation
- Moldovans voting "in record numbers",
- police reported evidence of an unprecedented effort by Russia to spread disinformation and buy votes
- Dozens of men were arrested, accused of travelling to Serbia for firearms training and co-ordinating unrest





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